HISTORY
of
THE 306th Field Artillery
The Destruction of the Tannerie. August 21, 1918
P. C., 306th F. A.,
21 August, 1918. 20 hr. OPERATIONS ORDER.
No. 5
I. The enemy occupy the Tannerie at 204.2-286.8 and the
crossing of road and railroad at 293.8-286.9. Our
infantry extend along the Reims road to within 300 yards
east of the Tannerie. They are in the woods 400 yards
west of the above mentioned road-railroad crossing.
During daylight of today, fire will be very accurately
adjusted by the 1st Bn. as close to the Tannerie and the
road-railroad crossing as the present location of the
infantry will permit. Previous to nine o'clock to-night
the infantry will be withdrawn so that none will be
within 500 yards of the two objectives. At nine o'clock
fire will begin on the Tannerie and the road-railroad
crossing and will continue until ten o'clock at which
time fire will cease. Rate of fire from nine to ten
P.m.-four shots per minute on the Tannerie and four shots
per minute on the road-railroad crossing: total, 480 H.
E. shells.
By order of Lieutenant-Colonel Smith.
E. E. NELSON,
Captain, 306th F. A., A. E. F. Operations Officer.
Operations order No- 5 was not received in writing until
the firing of the mission was well under way, but it was
conveyed verbally at 5:00 P-M-
The delivery of an accurate fire on a distant target can
only be insured by good observation or registration and
the Tannerie was not visible from the 0. P. of the 1st
Battalion. A quick glance at the visible and invisible
areas on the map showed this. So, either an 0. P. from
which the Tannerie was visible had to be found, or
adjustment made on some visible reference point and the
fire then transferred by accurate map measurement to the
actual target.
The most desirable course was a registration on the
Tannerie itself. But an 0. P. had to be found that could
see the target, and at the same time communicate with the
battery commander during an adjustment. This was
attempted, but a half hour was spent with no result.
Communication could not be obtained to any 0. P. that
could see the Tannerie. (The ground falls down steeply
over the river, and such an 0. P. had to be well
forward.) Further time could not be spent on this except
as a side issue. The method of a shift from a
registration point must be used. We decided to use our
own O.P., and adjust on the quarry southeast of Bazoches.
The artillery 0. P's. in this sector were on a ridge
about four thousand meters from the Vesle. From this
ridge the ground sloped down to the Mareuil
-Chery-Chartreuve Road about 1500 meters distant from
where the battalion P. C. and telephone central were
situated. The line from the 0. P. came down this slope,
and to adjust the batteries this line must be kept open.
This slope sheltered many batteries and the Boche knew
it. Their shells were bursting on it day and night, and
not only punished the batteries, but continually cut the
lines of wire to the 0. P. When the shelling was heavy a
detail working continually were unable to maintain
reliable communication. At five o'clock in the afternoon
of August 21st, the shelling was heavy and the line to
the 0. P. was out.
The battalion commander and the battery commanders met
and planned. Accurate fire had to be obtained, therefore
an adjustment must take place. There were many O.P.'s on
the ridge, and if our wire were not repaired in time we
would use the wire and possibly the 0. P. of another
organization. The battery commanders were to go to the 0.
P., previously preparing their batteries to fire on the
quarry selected as the visible registration point, and
the battalion detail would obtain communication.
At about 6:00 the
battery commanders started for the 0. P. through the
shell fire, and the battalion detail sent out all
available men as reinforcements on the 0. P. line. The
day previous Lieutenant Tritt and Private Kane of the
detail were killed while at work on this 0. P., and two
men wounded, and now the shelling was dangerously heavy
but the men worked well in spite of it. Reports of
progress came in but telephone communication could not be
established.
Meanwhile, every other wire to the ridge was looked up
and tried. The Third Battalion of our regiment had a
line. It was out, but communication was expected at any
moment. The Second Battalion line was tried and talked
over; their 0. P. being less than one hundred yards from
ours. But while giving direction to call the battery
commanders to this 0. P. the line went out. Another wire
was through the infantry system to the dressing station
where Lieutenant Tritt had died about three hundred
meters from our 0. P. Communication was had here but this
line went out also before word could be sent out to the
battery commanders. It seemed as if unseen spies were
cutting us off in all directions.
Meanwhile time was flying, the fire was to start at nine,
and as yet nothing had been accomplished. No one who has
not experienced it can realize the time that can be used
in vain strivings over the telephone.
From time to time
the battalion detail repaired breaks in our line only to
find more farther on, or new ones behind them. Reports of
progress came from the telephone details of the other
organizations, but no communication resulted. Visual
signals were considered but not tried. A few days after
this, determined efforts developed our signal detail so
that we could adjust by visual signals, but now this
could not be relied upon and the trained signalers were
out on the wire. They couldn't be called off.
Seven o'clock came and no more progress. Something
radical had to be done. The regimental commander was
consulted and a course of action decided upon not ideal,
but the only possible solution. An officer was to go up
to the 0. P. and notify the battery commanders that at
eight o'clock B Battery was to fire six shots. At 8.10A
Battery would fire six shots. They would observe as best
they could and return with all speed to modify the data
for the mission by the results of their observations. Of
course none of the shots might be observable, and if not,
there was no way of firing again unless communication
happened to be established.
Lieutenant Bryan was chosen to carry this message up to
the 0. P.; his watch was synchronized with ours and at
7.15 he started up through the shelling. The batteries
prepared their data, laid their guns, and waited. The
officers in the battalion position looked at their
watches and waited. The work on the wires continued, but
the shelling was increasing. No wires could live under
such fire; and now gas shells mixed in with the high
explosive. The doubt about whether the shots would be
observable was over-shadowed by the fear that the officer
might not get through with the message.
Eight o'clock came, B fired and the six shells whistled
overhead. Eight ten, and A followed.
The guns were
cleaned, and laid for the Tannerie, and we waited. The
enemy shelling had not ceased.
At 8.40 B Battery
telephoned that the battery commander had arrived and had
had good observation on five shots. At 8.50 A Battery
reported all six shots observed. The necessary changes in
data based on the observations were quickly made, and
promptly at 9.00 the party opened. Two hundred and forty
shells were fired on the Tannerie and an equal amount on
the crossroad. At ten o'clock we ceased fire and shortly
after midnight we heard that the infantry had gained
their objective.
The next day the infantry reported that the fire was very
accurate, and the Tannerie totally obliterated, not even
a wall left, and airplane photographs showed this to be
the case. The center of impact was squarely on the
target.
It wasn't until after the firing that the narrow margin
by which we won was found out by those in the rear.
Lieutenant Bryan who had carried the message up the hill
had had great difficulty in getting through. The shelling
was most severe, the men in the battery positions on the
slope had all taken cover, then the gas came, the alarm
was given, and masks were put on. Lieutenant Bryan put on
his mask and took cover-but only for a moment. His
mission was clearly to get through, so he continued, but
with mask on. The exertion of the climb and running
rendered the mask unbearable if he were to continue, so
he removed the mask and ran through without it, arriving
at three minutes to eight with choked lungs and swimming
eyes.
During the firing, the Hun sent over a plane and dropped
flares over our battery positions, and early next morning
their planes were active. The batteries were camouflaged
and apparently the Boche could not locate them for an
adjustment. At about half-past ten in the morning they
opened up in a terrific zone fire on the battalion area,
of which however A Battery received the most. The gun-
crews took to the shallow shelters in the woods, but in
spite of the broad zone covered, the shelling was so
heavy that many bursts occurred around the shelters, one
of which killed Lieutenant S. J. Reid, Jr., the battery
commander.
A message from the division commander, congratulating the
battalion on the accurate and effective fire of the night
before, arrived just as Lieutenant Reid was laid in his
grave in the little woods by his battery where he had
fallen. But his work was carried on to the end of the war
by Lieutenant Bryan who had carried the message to the 0.
P. and succeeded him in command of the battery. And the
Huns paid.
FAIRMAN R. DICK,
Major, 306th F. A.